Case Analysis: Rajbala v. State of Haryana (2016) 2 Scc 445.

Author: Muskan Mishra.

CITATION

(2016) 2 Scc 445.

NAMES OF PARTIES

Petitioners: Rajbala & Others;

Respondents: State of Haryana & Others.

JUDGES

Justice Jasti Chelameswar.

INTRODUCTION

“It is only education which gives a human being the power to discriminate between right and wrong, good, and bad. Therefore, prescription of an educational qualification is not irrelevant for better administration of the panchayats.”

The Supreme Court on December 10 2015, rendered people desirous of contesting elections ineligible on basis of five criteria. It upheld the Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act 2015 which disqualified the common, poor, and disadvantaged people living in rural areas of Haryana on the basis of five categories. Although the Supreme Court has ruled that it is legitimate to place some limitations on people’s ability to vote and choose the candidates they choose, there are concerns that these limits may further marginalize many underprivileged populations.

FACTS

• The petitioners filed a writ petition challenging the legal validity of the Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act 2015 (hereafter referred to as impugned act). The Act amended Section 175 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act 1994 which stipulated disqualification criteria that rendered people ineligible to contest Panchayat elections.
• The Act of 2015 establishes two kinds of voters: those who are qualified to vote in panchayat elections based on their educational achievement and those who are not.
• The impugned act inserted five conditions. If a person befalls in any of these, he will be disqualified to contest elections. These conditions are as follows:
  • Section 175 (1) (a) Persons against whom charges are framed in criminal cases for offences punishable with imprisonment for not less than ten years,
  • Section 175 (1) (t) Persons who fail to pay arrears, if any, owed by them to either a Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society or District Central Cooperative Bank or District Primary Agricultural Rural Development Bank,
  • Section 175 (1) (u) Persons who have arrears of electricity bills,
  • Section 175 (1) (v) Persons who do not possess the specified educational qualification and lastly
  • Section 175 (1) (w) Persons not having a functional toilet at their place of residence
• The petitioners later filed a writ petition questioning the legitimacy of the 2015 Amendment, alleging they wanted to contest in the Panchayat elections but were barred from doing so because they did not have the necessary educational credentials.
• The amendment was challenged greatly on the grounds that it gravely causes gross injustice to the people wishing to contest panchayat elections and goes against the spirit of Constitution by breaching the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14.
• Furthermore, the petitioners challenged the impugned act based on following contentions:
  • Firstly, the disqualifications are unreasonable, arbitrary and creates unreasonable restrictions on the right to contest elections.
  • Secondly, it creates an artificial and unnecessary classification amongst the candidates whereby this classification has no nexus or relevance to the object of the main act and moreover it serves no purpose to improvise the process of elections.
• Article 243F of the Constitution of India contains different disqualifications of members from contesting Panchayat elections. the petitioners raised the issue whether the State Legislature is authorised or entitled to lay down “qualifications” in contrast to “disqualifications” mentioned in the given Article.
• The Supreme Court determined that there is only a conceptual difference between qualification and disqualification, and that there is no actual legal separation between the two.
• The Supreme Court later decided, citing its earlier decisions, that there is a settled legal position that the right to contest elections is a fundamental right, despite the Respondents’ contention that there is neither a constitutional right to do so nor a Fundamental Right to do so.
• The State claimed in its submissions that even if there were a constitutional right to run for office, that right should be subject to the conditions or disqualifications specified in Article 243F, which gives the State Legislature the power to establish requirements.

ISSUES

Main issues raised in the present case questioned the validity of the Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act 2015. The major issues were:

1. Whether the right to vote and right to contest elections is statutory constitutional right?
2. Whether the State Legislature is authorised or entitled to lay down “qualifications” in contrast to “disqualifications”?
3. Whether an Act can be declared unconstitutional on the ground of being “arbitrary” in nature?
4. Whether the Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act 2015 creates unreasonable classification among people belonging to same class without any nexus to the object being sought?
5. Can an Act become unconstitutional if it is disqualifying a section of society?

JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court quashed the petitions holding the Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act 2015 reasonable and non-arbitrary. The court, while dealing with all the issues, reached the decision that the amendment is the need of the hour and the disqualifications mentioned in it will prove to be very helpful and will result in enhancement of the administrative bodies of rural areas. Let us analyse all the issues separately along with the contentions of both parties and the judgement.

1. Whether the right to vote and right to contest elections is statutory constitutional right?

Determining whether the right to contest elections is a statutory right or constitutional right is necessary in order to identify the extent to which this right can be curtailed or regulated by the government. For instance, constitutional rights are supreme rights guaranteed by constitutions whereas statutory rights emanate from a statute.

Contentions of the Respondents

The respondents contended that the rights to vote and contest elections are not constitutional but purely statutory. The respondents based their arguments on the precedent cases. In Shyamdeo Prasad Singh v. Nawal Kishore Yadav,((Shyamdeo Prasad Singh v. Nawal Kishore Yadav (2000) 8 SCC 46.)) “it has to be remembered that right to contest an election, a right to vote and a right to object to an ineligible person exercising right to vote are all rights and obligations created by statute.”

Furthermore, in K. Krishna Murthy (Dr) & Others v. Union of India & Another,((K. Krishna Murthy (Dr) & Others v. Union of India & Another (2010) 7 SCC 202 para 77.)) it was observed by the court, “…… it is a well-settled principle in Indian Law, that the right to vote and contest elections does not have the status of fundamental rights. Instead, they are in the nature of legal rights.” Another case that the Respondents relied upon was Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar & Others.((Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar & Others (2015) 3 SCC 467.)) The court in this case observed this court observed that the right to contest an election is a plain and simple statutory right.

Court’s decision

Going a step beyond the contentions of the respondent, court peeled into the layers of the issue of right to vote and contest election as being statutory or constitutional. The court observed in the case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Another v. Union of India & Another,((People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Another v. Union of India & Another (2003) 4 SCC 399.)) the constitutionality of the Representation of Peoples Act 1951, which requires anyone running for office to automatically provide personal information before submitting a nomination form, was questioned. As a result, it was determined that the right to run for office is a constitutional right. Furthermore, in Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK) & Another v. Election Commission of India,((Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK) & Another v. Election Commission of India (2012) 7 SCC 340.)) the regional party allegedly demanded an electoral symbol indefinitely, but the honourable court ruled that no party could receive a symbol permanently unless the party complied with the requirements of the symbol order. The finding that the right (to vote and the right to contest) is a constitutional right was also unanimously accepted.

The court analysed various Articles of the Constitution stipulating rights to vote and contest election for various administrative bodies such as Articles 54 and 66 (election for president. Vice president and Parliament), 325 and 326 (limitations on voting rights), 84 and 173 (qualifications to contest), and 102 and 191 (disqualifications to contest).

The court in the strict sense held that the right to vote and contest election is a constitutional right after examining the layout of these several. Articles reveals that not everyone who is eligible to vote due to the declaration in Article 326 is automatically authorized to vote. The right of a voter to run in elections for any of the entities is further restricted in some ways. By inference, these numerous clauses provide a constitutional right to run for election to these various bodies and offices. This conclusion is unavoidable since there would be no need to impose constitutional restrictions on a non-existent constitutional right. Therefore, these are undoubtedly constitutional rights and not statutory rights as contended by the respondents.

2. Whether the State Legislature is authorised or entitled to lay down “qualifications” in contrast to “disqualifications”?

The court observed, “Articles 84 and 173 purport to stipulate qualifications for membership of Parliament and Legislatures of the State respectively. Articles 102 and 191 purport to deal with disqualifications for membership of the above mentioned two bodies respectively. All the four Articles authorise the Parliament to prescribe further qualifications and disqualifications, as the case may be, with reference to the membership of Parliament and Legislatures of the State as the case may be. There is no clear indication in any one of these four Articles or in any other part of the Constitution as to what is the legal distinction between those two expressions.”

The court concluded that there is not a logical pattern in both sets of Articles nor any other signal that would allow one to tell the two statements apart legally. As a result, there is no connection between the distinction between qualifications and disqualifications and it is solely semantic or theoretical.

3. Whether an Act can be declared unconstitutional on the ground of being arbitrary in nature?

Contentions of the Petitioners

The petitioners argued that any rule that is incompatible with the Constitution’s stated goal of establishing a democratic, republican system of government is unreasonable and thus “arbitrary”. They contended that this was promised in the Preamble of the Constitution. Petitioners placed reliance upon Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Another,((Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Another (1973) 4 SCC 225 para 1159.)) and Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain.((Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp SCC 1, paras 563 and 578.))

In support of the proposition that a statute can be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it is arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14, petitioners relied upon judgments of this Court reported in Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation & Another,((Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation & Another (2014) 8 SCC 682.)) Indian Council of Legal Aid v. Bar Council of India,((Indian Council of Legal Aid v. Bar Council of India (1995) 1 SCC 732.)) B. Prabhakar Rao & Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others((B. Prabhakar Rao and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others 1985 (Supp) SCC 432.)) and D.S. Nakara and Others v. Union of India((D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305.)) and certain observations made by Justice A.C. Gupta in his dissenting judgment in R.K. Garg v. Union of India.((R.K. Garg v. Union of India (1981) 4 SCC 675.)) But the court held that it is not permissible for this Court to declare a statute unconstitutional on the ground that it is ‘arbitrary.’

Placing reliance on the Prabhakar Rao case,[ Supra note 10] petitioners brought the attention of judges on the statement “action of the Government and the provisions of the legislation were plainly arbitrary and discriminatory” to strengthen their submission that an Act must be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it is arbitrary.

Decision of the court

The court held that the judiciary do not take on the task of declaring a piece of legislation unconstitutional on the grounds that the legislation is “arbitrary” because doing so implies making a value judgment, and courts do not look at the wisdom of legislative decisions unless the legislation is also in violation of a specific constitutional provision. Therefore, The Courts in India have no authority to declare a statute invalid on the ground that it violates the “due process of law” or is “arbitrary.”

4. Whether the Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act 2015 creates unreasonable classification among people belonging to same class without any nexus to the object being sought?

Contentions of the Petitioners

The petitioners argued that the requirement of a minimum educational qualification would have the effect of disqualifying more than 50% of people who would have otherwise been qualified to run for office in panchayats under the law in place prior to the impugned act by citing various statistics from the National Population Register 2011. It is further argued that those from lower socioeconomic statuses, women, and members of scheduled castes would be the most negatively impacted by the contested provision because the majority of them are the least likely to meet the impugned act’s minimal educational requirements.

Less than 50% of the otherwise eligible women (all women, regardless of caste) would be permitted to run for office, while 68% of women from scheduled castes and 41% of men from scheduled castes would not be permitted to run for panchayat office. How many literate men would be eligible to run for panchayats at different levels depends on the data for men, which is not entirely clear. There is no information on the record that specifically identifies their individual educational backgrounds.

Contentions of the Respondents

The Respondents cited Section 21 of the act, which lists the 30 main categories of responsibilities that Gram Panchayats must fulfil. It is said that the legislature, in its wisdom, decided it was appropriate to set a minimum educational requirement considering the duties that members elected to the Gram Panchayat must do. This requirement cannot be argued to unfairly categorize voters, risking the wrath of Article.

Decision of the court

The court held that the impugned act does not create any unreasonable classifications and does not lack any nexus to the object sought in the impugned act. The goal of this classification is to make sure that candidates for panchayats have a basic education that will enable them to carry out the many responsibilities that fall on the elected representatives of the panchayats more successfully. One cannot claim that the goal being pursued is illogical, unlawful, or unrelated to the objectives of the act or the provisions of part IX of the Constitution. Only through education can a person acquire the ability to distinguish between good and bad. Therefore, requiring a certain level of knowledge is necessary for improved panchayats management.

5. Can an Act become unconstitutional if it is disqualifying a section of society?

The impugned act is disqualifying a section of society on the basis of various grounds from contesting election by the virtue of clauses (t), (u), (v) and (w) of section 175 (1).

Contentions of the Petitioners

• The petitioners contended that the educational qualifications mandated under the clause (v) create unreasonable qualification disqualifying a major section of the society.
• Additionally, clause (u) places an unjustified burden on voters who would otherwise be eligible to run for office, creating an artificial classification that has no connection to the goals that the act seeks to accomplish. Agriculturists, who make up the majority of our rural population, are particularly highly indebted, according to the petitioners, and a considerable number of them have apparently been committing suicide because they are unable to handle their debt. Because the Panchayati Raj Act’s constitutional purpose is to give the rural population more power by allowing them to participate in the decision-making of the units of local self-government, the prescriptions under clauses (t) and (v) of Section 175(1) of the Act are therefore an arbitrary prescription that creates a class of people who would become ineligible to run in Panchayat elections. This classification also has no rational connection to the object of the Act.
• The petitioners said that many rural residents simply cannot afford to have a toilet at their home since it is out of their financial reach. Making them unable to run in panchayat elections would be unfair and discriminatory since it would place a group of people who would otherwise be entitled to do so in an unjustified classification.

Contentions of the Respondents

• The respondents contended that object sought to be achieved is to have “model representatives” for local self-government for better administrative efficiency which will happen when there will exist an educational bar.
• It is the submission of the respondents that although it is a fact that there have been cases in various parts of the country where people reportedly commit suicides unable to escape the debt trap but such incidents are very negligible in the State of Haryana as the agricultural sector of Haryana is relatively more prosperous compared to certain other parts of the country.
• The respondents argued that if someone in the State of Haryana does not have a working toilet at their residence, it is not because they are unable to afford one, but rather because they do not wish to have such a facility there. This is because the government has provided the people with all required resources to assist in building toilets at their residences. The respondents make the very strong argument that a beneficial rule created as a step toward ending the dangerous practice of defecating in public in rural India should not be rejected.

Decision of the court

• The court held that in order to administer properly, basic education is must. Thus, if an act is making it a necessary criterion for a person to contest election, it is neither unconstitutional nor arbitrary.
• The court ruled that it is useless to discuss statistics on how many individuals commit suicide or are in debt in rural areas. It also noted that those who are so deeply in debt are unlikely to be interested in running in elections, whether at the panchayat level or elsewhere. The court noted that elections in this nation, regardless of their level, are costly events. In addition, they are costly affairs not just in this nation but everywhere else as well. In this situation, it should be uncommon for someone who is heavily in debt to run for office because doing so would be beyond their financial means. The challenge, as the court described it, is more hypothetical than real. Furthermore, nothing in the law prevents a person who is so indebted and meets the requirements of Section 175(1) of the Act’s clauses (t) and (v) from running in the panchayat elections after making the necessary arrangements to pay off their debt.

The Court reiterated the respondents’ arguments and concluded that the reason why some persons still lack access to a toilet is not because they are poor but rather because they lack the necessary will. Keeping the area under its jurisdiction clean is one of a civic body’s essential responsibilities. Those who wish to lead those civic bodies by being voted to them must serve as role models for others. To this end, if the legislature rules that people who do not adhere to basic hygiene standards are not eligible to serve as administrators of the civic body and are not eligible to run for office as members of the civic body, the court believes that such a policy cannot be justified as creating a class based on illogical criteria or as having no relation to the goal of the Act.

ANALYSIS

Before he was known as the “Father of the Indian Constitution,” Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar wrote a landmark paper to the Simon Commission in 1928 that set the standard for Indian nationalists arguing for universal suffrage. He stated in his now-classic memorandum.

“Those who insist on literacy as a test and insist upon making it a condition precedent to enfranchisement, in my opinion, commit two mistakes. Their first mistake consists in their belief that an illiterate person is necessarily an unintelligent person. Their second mistake lies in supposing that literacy necessarily imports a higher level of intelligence or knowledge than what the illiterate possesses.”

The Supreme Court in this case observed, “It is only education which gives a human being the power to discriminate between right and wrong, good, and bad. Therefore, prescription of an educational qualification is not irrelevant for better administration of panchayats.” by doing so, it has completely cancelled out the capability of uneducated populace of the country to discriminate between right and wrong, good, and bad. It has given zero value to the experience and social intelligence of a person. Moreover, particularly at the panchayat level, there is little factual evidence to support the notion that individuals with formal education may serve as stronger public representatives and administrators than those without education.

Ironically, anecdotal data appears to suggest the contrary. Due to their comprehensive awareness, many elected officials, particularly female panchayat leaders, can address problems more successfully by drawing on their personal struggles and those that their families encounter on a daily basis. This is when compared to those who have always had power, the former appears to be better able to tolerate poverty and a lack of opportunity. Thus, the attributes essential for effective and competent political and administrative leadership are unrelated to formal education.

CONCLUSION

India is a democratic nation where each voter is free to select their own representative. As a result, when you argue that those who lack a formal education should not be allowed to run for office, you are really arguing that you do not trust the public to pick who will best represent their interests. This is conceited and condescending.

The court observed that there is a difference between the right to vote and the right to contest election and that the right to vote is not being restricted. They are inevitably co-related. By limiting the pool of candidates, the electorate can choose from, entrance barriers to running for office effectively restrict the right to vote. Even though it is implemented covertly, it still constitutes a vote limitation. Furthermore, because people who have been denied access to or chances for education are often the most disadvantaged members of society, this amendment discriminates along the lines of gender and caste.

Additionally, there are many members of Parliament and state legislatures who lack a basic education. Therefore, if a filter based on a minimum education requirement were to be implemented at higher levels of government, many members would be at risk of disqualification and being prevented from running for office again.

It is injudicious to attribute the lack of formal education on the populace when, in reality, it reflects the state’s ineffective performance of its constitutional duties. The negligence of the state and societal inequality are the causes of deprivation. State governments would do better if they concentrated more on guaranteeing fair educational opportunities and respecting and enhancing the authority of the local entities rather than acting like an ostrich and hiding their heads in the sand during dire circumstances.