Case Analysis: Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. (Sabarimala Temple, in re) v. The State of Kerala and Ors. (2019) 11 SCC 1.

Author: Dharini Ranganathan.

CITATION

(2019) 11 SCC 1.

NAMES OF PARTIES

Petitioners: Indian Young Lawyers Association and Others (Sabarimala Temple, in re);

Respondents: The State of Kerala and Others.

JUDGES

Justice Dipak Misra (assenting);

Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman (assenting);

Justice AM Khanwilkar (assenting);

Justice D Y Chandrachud (assenting);

Justice Indu Malhotra (dissenting).

INTRODUCTION

The discourse on human rights has in its practical application, remained a monologue of the male majorly, downplaying the on par relevance of females, as well as the other genders. There is severely a lack of perspective on enforcement of rights to all identities of the society. Customs, considered to consist a significant chunk of the source of law has held its iniquity in determining and setting contemporarily impractical differentiations for humans of various genders. Religious freedom, by ingraining secularism in its most foundational tenets, the Constitution has kept itself away from the equation between man and God, keeping a certain aloofness from treating one religion over another. However, within religion itself, the right of persons to hold certain practices has abominably trapped the vision of an equal and practical society with antediluvian ideas and obstacles.

In the case of Indian Young Lawyers Association¹, popularly called the Sabarimala judgment assessed one such belief and customary practice of religion that had since time immemorial kept an entire part of people denied from what they can call their right. By lifting the ban for menstruating women from visiting the revered Sabarimala temple, the Supreme Court in this judgment attempted to tread upon the constitutional guarantees for the people of India that are equal for all genders, even in matters of religion, and the interplay between religion and law, religion and morality, and religion and relevance within the meaning of the constitutional provisions under Article 13, 14, 15, 17, 25 and 26.

Although the judgment has, dauntlessly put forth the right of menstruating women to enter into the temple that had its doors closed, it however proved to be much ahead of what the classes of people surrounding the beliefs and the matters of the temple and the women in question themselves had a view upon. This again raises the question of the rapport of the constitution to the diversity of human beings, and how the vision of the constitution to ensure a society that does not rely on social evils to justify its behaviour, instead gives room to all the characters under the common identity of human beings, under an accepted and relevant constitution.

To assess this aspect, it is important to understand the rationale and the justifications involved in the Sabarimala case, the facets of the assenting and the dissenting opinions in lieu of the constitutional guarantee of the right of religious identities and freedoms for retaining and to carry forth the same through traditions and customs, and what kind of effect it has on the people as a whole, whether the interpretation of the constitutional rights have shed enough light in justifying what has been called a historic judgment in established the equality of genders in religion, an attempt of which has been made through this case analysis.

FACTS

• The entire discussion and judgment on the right of women in the course of religious practices and customs has arisen from the writ petition preferred by the petitioners, Indian Young Lawyers Association, under Article 32 of the Constitution.
• The writ petition sought to guarantee the admittance of female devotees between the ages of 10 and 50 into the Lord Ayyappan Temple at Sabarimala in the State of Kerala. The temple which is believed to be of an eternal celibate symbolizing purity and abstinence is managed by its Dewasvom Board, established by Section 4 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 under the state, partly funded by the State government.
• The petition also sought to declare Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred as Rule 3(b)) made under the Kerala Hindu Places of Worship Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred as the Act) as unconstitutional and violative of Article 14, 15, 25 and 51A(e) of the Constitution of India, 1950 for it prohibits the exercise of religious freedom of women between 10-50 age group from entering the temple premises.
• The case drew the erudite opinions of amici curiae senior counsels Mr Raju Ramachandran and Mr K Ramamoorthy, respectively for the petitioners and the respondents.
• Delving into the origins, prevalence and the social and religious perception that has enlivened the prohibition from entering a place of worship. The primary reference was made to the case of S Mahendran v. the Secretary, Travancore Dewasvom Board, Thiruvananthapuram & ors.² (hereafter referred as the Mahendran judgment) that, on a similar contention held that the ban on entry of women into the Sabarimala Temple was a religious affair, not one to be governed by the law and was not discrimination in the sense that it infringes the fundamental rights of the women.
• The justification of the Mahendran judgment as well as the contentions of the respondents in the present case has traced the practice to the belief that women in the menstruating span of life can cause a deity to deviate from celibacy and the shrine to lose its austerity.
• Furthermore, the contentions went to define the Sabarimala temple as a religious denomination that has its exclusive rights to manage its own affairs and follow distinct and necessary practices.
• The facts of this case are at a constant interplay between the constitutional aspects of religious freedoms, the perspectives on religious denominations, the existence of customs and practices at the fault-lines of other basic fundamental rights, and the relevance in the present context.

ISSUES

The Court had summed up the following issues to be addressed by to give ratio and justification to the prayer raised by the petition. These are:

1. Whether the customary exclusion of women in the age group of 10-50 based on the biological factor of menstruation and fertility is discriminatory and redundant, violating the fundamental rights as under Articles 14, 15 and 17 and immoral in the usage of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution?
2. Whether as a religious institution, it can make a claim under the guise of the freedom to regulate its own affairs in issues of religion to justify the exclusion of women as essential to the religious practices and fundamentals?
3. Whether the Ayyappan temple is a separate denomination in the concept of religion, and if it is, whether it can continue upholding the customs that do not conform with constitutional principles?
4. Whether it is permissible for a “religious denomination” to forbid access of women between the ages of 10 and 50 according to Rule 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules? If so, would banning access for women based only on their violate Articles 14 and 15(3) of the Constitution?
5. Whether Rule 3(b of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 is ultra vires to the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965 and the fundamental rights?

The High Court of Kerala, in the Mahendran judgment, formed three questions in this aspect that have also been taken as relevant to address which were rather directly worded,

1. Whether woman of the age group 10 to 50 can be permitted to enter the Sabarimala temple at any period of the year or during any of the festivals or poojas conducted in the temple?
2. Whether or if the refusal to let that group of women enter the country constitutes discrimination and a violation of Articles 15, 25, and 26 of the Indian Constitution?
3. Whether it is possible for the High Court to give the Devaswom Board and the Keralan government instructions to limit the entry of such women to the temple?

JUDGMENT

With Justice Indu Malhotra dissenting, the bench had held that the prohibition of women of the age group 10-50 into the Sabarimala temple was against constitutional principles and against the fundamental rights that are bestowed to all classes and sections of the society.

The petitioners have contended that the Sabarimala temple does not become a separate religious denomination abstract from Hinduism. It has been argued that for a religious denomination, there must be certain distinctiveness from an already existing religion, hence right to hold property and retain certain rituals and practices and all the other rights under Article 26 of the Constitution. Referring to the Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt³ where it had been described that although the ceremonies, rituals and rules in a religion for the mere reason that they partake in economic activities do not become secular in nature, at the same time, it need not be essential to the existence of the religion. For a religion described by certain practices, these practices need to be so essential to the religion to come under the protections given to religious denominations. Also, there is the three criteria test for determining whether an institution or a section is a religious denomination as it was laid down in the SP Mittal v. Union of India & ors.[ 1983 SCR 729.] In the matter of entry into the temple, the practice, as the petitioners claimed was not fundamental to the Hindu Religion that the Sabarimala temple formed a part of.

Citing Sri Venkataramana Devary v. State of Mysore & ors.,⁴ that albeit being protected by Article 26(b), a denomination’s right to completely bar members of the public from participating in temple worship must give way to the supreme right established by Article 25(2)(b) to allow members of the public to attend a temple for worship. The fact that custom and usage does not ban women at any and all times to enter the temple makes it a weak claim to exclude only a particular age group of women from entering the temple when men and women are already classes that cannot be divided into further classes. This can be found in Rule 3(b) that does not completely exclude any woman and the interpretation of the same as barring only particular women would be naturally unconstitutional. Referring to Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University & anr.⁵ that segregating the entire class of women based on a biological factor is not a reasonable differentiation without any valid objective and hence is a discriminating aspect on basis of sex, against the dignity of a female, quantifying her fertility, in other words menstrual discrimination.

It is necessary that practices that need to be cognized as unfit for the evolved society, and also on the basis of evidence that this practice of exclusion was not consistent throughout what history has laid down, and hence, it amounted to an erratic notion of untouchability that menstruating women are subjected to rather explicitly in the patriarchal society reinforced through religion in the name of customs hence, violative of Article 14, 15, 17 and 21.

Along these lines, the Amicus Curiae, Senior Advocate Mr Raju Ramachandran who submitted that the Sabarimala temple is a public temple, for the purpose of worshipping the deity, to enter the premises of which is a legal right more than a permissive right. Article 25(1) which declares equal entitlement to religious and divine pursuits is non-discriminatory. The Amicus has argued that the exclusionary practice’s application causes women to reveal both their age and menstrual status against their will, which amounts to compelled disclosure and, as a result, breaches their right to dignity and privacy guaranteed by Article 21. Further, he went he contended that the practice of barring women from entering the Sabarimala temple must be demonstrated by the respondents to be so essential to religious belief that it is necessary for the survival of the faith. Contrarily, the respondents in this case have not presented any scriptural support for their claim that the exclusion of women is a fundamental tenet of their religion.

The Amicus Curiae of the respondents, learned senior counsel Mr. K Ramamoorthy contended that a religious belief was one that was in practice and consideration of the people for a long time and hence it would be enough basis to consider the Sabarimala temple as a religious denomination with the practice of keeping women in the age group of 10-50 as one essential to the beliefs of the denomination. A perspective was pointed about that if Article 25 were to be viewed solely, then many religious practices from all prominent temples would be violative of the fundamental rights. They further contended that the nature of the nature of worship and practices observed by the temple, Ayyappan Temple is also a denomination as defined by Article 26 and likewise, devotees of Ayyappan Temple would also constitute a denomination if they accepted the contested religious practice based on a belief that has been in vogue for many centuries unbroken and accepted by all sections of Hindus.

Referring to the Shrirur judgment⁶, the respondent said that the common faith of the followers of Ayyappan and the custom of the 41 day penance that excludes women because for not trekking the forests, hence the collection of individuals can be identified distinctly, addressed as Ayyappans the individuals in the penance whose intent is to visit the Sabarimala temple. At this juncture the bench opined that in the additional temples dedicated to Lord Ayyappa, and this restriction is not present, and the Ayyappans do not form a distinct sect and hence, held the Sabarimala temple is a public place of worship and that the religion has no unique identifiable adherents. Referring to the doctrine of the Hindu religion, the court firmly believed that barring women from entry into the temples is not a part of the Hindu doctrines, and allowing access to the Sabarimala temple would not change the essence of the Hindu religion.

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Indu Malhotra, who relied on the contention of the respondents that the government is not empowered to establish an independent direction against prevalent customs or accord notions of rationality in religious matters. Whether a particular custom is to be tested for its validity, it must be assessed through the tenets of the religion that have created it. The explanatory reference of the respondents through the legends and the narratives that have directed the steps to visit the Sabarimala Shrine and the importance of these directions that the practice of prohibiting women in the age group is justified and for this only differs the manner of worship. Against the claim that menstrual taboo had prevailed a tradition and practice of untouchability against women at their menstruating period of time, where the judge had observed that no traditions followed by devotees at the Sabarimala Temple related to untouchability as defined by Article 17 merely on the terms of the penance to be carried out as per tradition. The tradition has nothing to do with any purported impurity or incapacity, hence, Rule 3(b) not being ultra vires of the Constitution.

In the question of enforceability of fundamental rights under Article 25(1) against the Travancore Dewasvom Board, the court had held the view that the right under 25(1) is irrespective of gender and exclusion of women from entry to religious premises of which has to be non-discriminatory and upon one’s conscience. It was held that the rule of exclusion in question cannot be justified on the grounds that allowing entry to women in the specified age group would, in any way, be harmful to public order, morality, health, or, for that matter, any other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. The assenting opinion had hence laid down that the definition of morality cannot be narrowed down to sections or religions, and neither can public order, or health, besides morality be used to discriminate against women’s right to freely practice religion and Rule 3(b) is ultra vires to the Act as well as Constitutionally invalid to be enforced.

ANALYSIS

Customs, Morality and Constitutional morality

Article 51A(e) of the Constitution of India has made it a part of fundamental duties that to safeguard the basic dignity of a woman is a basic respect to both humanity and religious diversities of the nation. At the same time, the Constitution of India has guaranteed that all religions will be respected in an equal manner and there shall be no state religion, hence, giving freedom to these religions to retain their customs and traditions that on an analysis with respect to the present times will bring many of them against the basic safeguard of a woman’s dignity. Although this varies from region to the socio-cultural perspective, an objective assessment will surely give such a result. There are many more religious standards that women have to conform to in the name of customs. When one makes an attempt to hold constitutional morality against customary principles, the legitimacy of each comes on whether it must be sectionalized or individualized. The morality formed by the constitutional vision, as phrased in the judgment relied on whether the fundamental guarantees that puts each individual on an equal level is upheld and at the same time, the essences of religion are not disrespected.

Referring to the Devaru judgment⁷, the judge pointed out that the right to practice, profess religion, pursuing this by entering public premises of temples, is an individual right given “to all classes and sections of Hindus”. The Justice DY Chandrachud highlighted that simply because custom, usages, and personal law contain associational characteristics of a religious nature does not give them constitutional immunity. Denying the supremacy of the constitution would mean exempting these actions from constitutional review. Such a view implicates the supremacy of the Constitution, quoting the observation in the case of Manoj Narula v. Union of India, “The democratic values survive and become successful where the people at large and the persons-in-charge of the institution are strictly guided by the constitutional parameters without paving the path of deviancy and reflecting in action the primary concern to maintain institutional integrity and the requisite constitutional restraints”.⁸ By directing the view of the case in such a direction, the judgment attempts to respect the pluralism and the expansiveness of constitutional guarantees to be the ‘living document’ that is dynamic to the needs of the society.

A relevant judgment of the Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and Ors. v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta⁹, where it was held that performing the Tandava dance part of the followers of Ananda Marga was restricted only on the basis that carrying skulls and daggers posed a significant risk on public health and morality, because the interests of the general public was compromised, however, this did not take away the right of the Ananda Margis to practice their Tandava dance in closed premises. Reading the situation of prohibition of entry of women to the temple, although the judgment implies that there is no infringement of public order, morality and health if women are allowed to enter the Sabarimala.

This perspective however is too generalized to be applicable on communities in the Indian society. It is difficult to ascribe a meaning to the expression morality for it goes down to its source which is again not uniform. Quoting the judgment, “Practices or beliefs which detract from these foundational values cannot claim legitimacy”¹⁰, does not justify the instance that morality and the foundational values can become transient, even if the concern has been raised, differing in beliefs that can be strongly protected as a religious denomination, again putting morality above basic human dignity. Allowing the entry of women into the Sabarimala temple will raise conundrum on other customary practices on the lines of the newly perceived morality, popular cultures, and the ambiguity of an evolving society.

The Discussion on Religious Denominations and Individual Right to Religion

Through the interpretation of the SP Mittal case¹¹, the judgment has interpreted how the Auroville Emergency Provisions Act is not a credible exercise of the right of religious denominations under Article 26 since it did not form a separate religious denomination. No outside authority has the authority to intervene with a religious denomination’s or organization’s judgement regarding whether rituals and ceremonies are necessary in accordance with the principles of the religion they practice. The three conditions for a religious denomination must include “i. A collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines that are common to guide their spiritual well-being, ii. It must have a common organization and iii. It must be recognized by a distinct name”.

The Sabarimala judgment interprets these tests for the Sabarimala temple holding that the faith inextricably forms a part of the Hindu religion, and cannot be attributed the status of a distinct religious denomination, and has rightly pointed out that the persons who prescribe to the Sabarimala temple visit’s 41-day penance and the trek do not cease to be Hindus, and Hinduism along with the Constitutional provisions do not bar any class or caste or genders from entering the premises of a Hindu religious institution.

The Court has rightly pointed out that since the Sabarimala temple comes under statutes that apply on many Hindu temples in the territorial application. Laying ground on the existing law and the policy that the temple in question is not abstract from Hindu practices, and even if it were, it would come under the stipulations of fundamental rights and the safeguard against discrimination, untouchability and harm to the basic dignity of women. This reasoning is similar to the cases where a ‘society’ or an ‘organization’ sought to establish themselves as a religious denomination but failed on the grounds that it has not departed from an existing religion, hence comes under the same. A religion is fundamental to a religious denomination, not the notions of caste, social status, class or sex. This interpretation is both logical and consistent with the explanation that supports it- Article 26 does not contain language that would make its provisions subordinate to the other fundamental freedoms, hence prevents either giving the right granted to religious denominations a precedence that supersedes other freedoms or allowing that freedom to live in a vacuum. This justifies the Constitutional ambition to not let religious rights override humanistic behaviors and equality of all before the law.

In the judgment in the light of Menstrual Taboos

Rule 3(b) of the Act of 1965, in its wordings have refrained from bracketing the age group of women in order to segregate them as a class, however their attempt to keep this vagueness in justifying the customary usage has resulted in its interpretation into a more fearful and restrictive segregation. “Women, at such time during which they are not by custom and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship”, has attempted to retain the practice of keeping women away from religious premises during that time, a custom forbids them to do so. This custom that a woman must not enter a place of public worship when in her menstrual period has existed for a long time in the belief that menstrual blood is impure and there is a period of impurity attached with the woman. However, science today has established that the menstruation is not exclusive to women, but also the other recognized sexes, and the blood that is associated with menstruation is only by custom and belief impure, otherwise, it constitutes a very natural process of the biological construct of a person who has a womb and is capable of reproducing.

With respect to the judgment, the judges have perorated upon the time-immemorial downplaying of women on the basis of their biological difference and the taboo that is attached to menstruation resulting in a very uninformed and unhealthy gray area for women. Rule 3(b) although reinforces the custom that women do not participate in religious activities when not in physical, mental and emotional ‘normalness’, the judgment and the opinion of the judges has given a positive implication on this narrow perspective towards women, a more practical and contemporarily significant turn. The judgment in this perspective has the capacity of changing the narrative on menstrual taboos and the stigma against women that has persisted in the subtle form of untouchability, however it has been contented that untouchability under Article 17 of the Constitution is limited to untouchability based on caste, which should not be constrictively used to ignore the untouchability practiced against women.

However, such a pioneering attempt of the judgment in a culturally diverse India will not percolate in the same manner. This can be seen as how the judgment had not materialized in the society, instead had led to religious anger and chagrin on the reality. Even women in a larger context themselves believe that menstruation is something that must naturally be kept away from religious activities. The contention of the respondents that no woman had to this date questioned the custom is an important point that emphasizes on the same.

Fundamental Rights: Articles 14, 15, 21

Although the respondents assert that they do not aim to discriminate on the basis of gender, it is imperative for the court must determine whether or not there has been a breach of basic rights based on the impact of the allegedly unlawful action rather than the respondents’ purpose. The intricacies in the fundamental rights discussion in the women in Sabarimala dialectic, the judgment has held a rather utopian view of against discrimination. Conservative retention of religious practices contrary to fundamental rights have been rightly pointed out in the light of the gender notions giving a light of common sense to the variable of perspective. The decision has not necessarily changed the existing situation of patriarchy and religion, however has paved the way to not let fundamental rights be downplayed by religious rights on the fundamental strata. Justifying the same by synonymizing constitutional morality with the need to enforce fundamental rights on instances of violation.

The Constitution does not tie these fundamental principles of equality to the other provisions of Part III, even though it guarantees equality and the equal protection of the laws in Article 14 and its emanation, Article 15, which forbids discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Quoting, “Dignity of the individual is the unwavering premise of the fundamental rights Autonomy nourishes dignity by allowing each individual to make critical choices for the exercise of liberty.”, in the sense establishes that using a natural, biological phenomenon of menstruation as a bar against certain freedom of movement, or the segregation from activities, would encroach upon the liberty to live life with liberty, dignity, privacy, by choice. This perspective of interpretation sheds light on all the statutory provisions and rules that can create a divide against certain sections in this manner and how these are unconstitutional to be enforced under the garb of custom or religion.

Doctrine of Essential Religious Practices

The court pointed out that the protection of essential religious practices for restriction of entry to women into the temple must be so profound in the religious belief that the very definition of religion will change with the removal of this practice. Referring to the case of N Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board & ors.¹² that, “the protection under Article 25 and 26 extend a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of religion and as to what really constitutes an essential part of religion or religious practice” hence raising a question as to whether essential practices of a religion can conflict with their autonomy to hold on to these practices against fundamental rights and their legal validity. Again, by separating an essential religious practice and secular activities, the judgment has focused on the debate of religious and fundamental rights, that is, the rights of communities against the rights of an individual.

However, from the perspective of a community, the practice that goes against what binds the community and gives them a common cultural meaning to abide by, the deviation to individuals does not fall as practical as it can be. The intention of the Constitution when it extends into personal aspects of an individual’s life is to ensure that the person is peacefully a part of the society, while retaining their individual choices and freedoms. For example, in the case of Mohd. Hanif Qureshi v. State of Bihar¹³, cattle slaughter was held not essential to the religion of Islam, or of the ceremony of Bakr-Id. However the respondents claimed that the exclusion of women was an essential religious practise and that it was consistent with the deity’s nature as a Naishtika Brahmacharya, the judgment has held that exclusion of women of the age group of 10-50 is not essential religious practice, by giving direction to the positive change that women need not be held by customs to not pursue their divine calling, instead, they can bring about a change in the belief system to establish that women have the right to enter the temple unrestrained by unreasonable factors.

The highlight of this observation is the fact that the judiciary worded the difference between superstition and religious beliefs. This must percolate to each and every section of the society be it the modern perception of religion, or the persisting beliefs in societies that have not seen the light of scientific and social evolution, leading to the understanding that superstition that women in the menstrual period are impure and must not be a part of religious activities. The reasoning and the judgment are both relevant, yet will not apply uniformly in the society, because the explanations given for the exclusion of women vary from the smell of menstrual blood attracting wild animals in the trek to the temple, and the mythological source that a certain god made an arrangement with the women in exchange of giving them periods. These are ingrained in the beliefs across various communities, and the credibility of the same become a hassle to refute at the constitutional level.

The Dissenting Opinion

In the dissenting opinion, Justice Indu Malhotra, had opined that the rationality cannot interfere with matters of religion, and the Honorable court does not have the authority to assess the same. The followers of various sects must not interfere with the faith and accordance of their religion. Religion-related equality and non-discrimination cannot be evaluated in isolation, but between the followers and the propagators of the faith in question. Relying on the power of judiciary to conduct the judicial review, the dissenting opinion attempts to keep the validity of determining religious matters away from the same. Whether a practice is valid or not must be with respect to the worshippers and the believers of the faith. However, this opinion is more restrictive and makes faiths and practices more at the behest of certain individuals or groups.

In a recent example, the Panchayat, which is a form of legal government had applied a fine on a married woman who had failed a virginity test, because the village and the community believed that the losing virginity was wrong and against the beliefs of the community, which is against fundamental rights of the woman, her dignity, privacy and the right to life and liberty. The opinion also attributed that the restriction on entry into the premises is subject to a religious denomination’s freedom to control its own affairs regarding religion. When the legislature drafted enabling legislation pursuant to Article 25(2)(b) that was made expressly subject to religious practices unique to a denomination under Article 26, Section 3 must be considered in the context of the Constitution. However, the aspect that ‘religious denomination’ should be examined more liberally in a secular society on the lines of peculiar features, however, in a diverse nation as India, this will lead to much chaos and conundrum, completely changing the identity and individuality of religious groups, impractical to the secular and fraternal promise of the constitution.

CONCLUSION

A quote from the book titled Renowned Goddess of Desire: Women, Sex, and Speech in Tantra, authored by Loriliai Biernacki goes, “…a recognition of the difference women present offers the possibility of a choice not to objectify women. This recognition recodes gendered relations inscribing woman discursively in the place of the subject…”, emphasises that the perspective of women through the lens of religion and religious beliefs would not rely on an objective view towards them with in religion and reality. In Hinduism, although women as goddesses are revered on the highest pedestal, their existence in reality and practical to the evolved sense of the society, a worse situation. The entry of women to the Sabarimala temple is one such differentiation action that has affected the perception of women and their biological segregation.

The Sabarimala case has at length discussed whether women can be segregated from the entry of women into the Sabarimala temple in Kerala on the basis that the deity cannot be put in the presence of fertile women. Four against one, the judgement had affirmed that reinforcement of rigid stereotypes against women and the taboo on menstruation cannot exactly be justified by a section of a religion as a separate section alone. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the fact that India is a party to this Convention emphasize that it is the responsibility of the State to end taboos surrounding menstruation based on customs or traditions, and further that the State should refrain from invoking the plea of custom or tradition to avoid their responsibility.
It is well within law that regressive practices be questioned and reviewed and removed from the society for the future generations. Religion is a choice and hence a right, which is not restrictive to genders or classes.

However, if the law encroaches upon the religions and religious aspects, the choice of religion becomes constrictive. Hence, there is a need that there is a systemic and organised understanding to the interaction between religion and constitutional morality, which is the basic doctrine for the citizens of India.

1. (2019) 11 SCC 1.[↩]
2. AIR 1993 Ker 42.[↩]
3. Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1005.[↩]
4. 1958 AIR 55.[↩]
5. 1989 2 SCC 145.[↩]
6. Supra, note 3.[↩]
7. Supra, note 5.[↩]
8. 2014 9 SCC 1.[↩]
9. 1983 4 SCC 522.[↩]
10. Supra, note 1.[↩]
11. Supra, note 4.[↩]
12. AIR 2002 SC 3538.[↩]
13. 1959 SCR 629.[↩]