Changing Trend of Indian Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan After the Resurgence of the Taliban Regime

Author: Tanishka Jain, B.A. LL.B (Hons.) 2022-27, MNLU Nagpur.
Description: The following blog is part of the collaboration between VidhiNama Education and Research Centre LLP with Think India – MNLU Nagpur Chapter for their inaugural Blog Writing Competition, themed “Contemporary Trends in India’s Foreign Policy”. The author of this blog, Tanishka Jain, bagged Rank 4 in this competition.

During the period between 2001 and August 2021, India’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan was primarily characterized by direct diplomatic engagement with the Afghan government. This approach focused on fostering robust diplomatic relations and providing assistance to Afghanistan. 

The night before the Taliban took over the city in 1996, India’s Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, shuttered the Indian embassy and left for Kabul to attend the opening of the Interim Government. Singh also set out to reestablish the Indian embassy. Since then, India and Afghanistan have had considerably better relations, owing to a variety of circumstances that enabled the revival and resuscitation of bilateral diplomatic relations feasible. First, when it comes to its after-9/11 Afghan plan of action, India followed the terms of the 2001 Bonn Agreement to the letter. Second, unlike with Pakistan, the existence of a disputed and continuous border did not adversely affect Indo-Afghan relations. Third, India was able to obtain formal support from the Kabul administration as several of the Northern Alliance members it had supported in the mid-1990s were appointed to the Interim administration or occupied important provincial roles.¹

India took a “Soft Power Approach” to Afghanistan, avoiding any kind of military action and concentrating more on non-military concerns than military ones. Following the formation of the Hamid Karzai-led Interim Government, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee declared that Afghanistan will get US $100 million in reconstruction assistance. India is now the fifth-largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan, having already committed over $3 billion on numerous initiatives since 2001. ²

The majority of India’s aid went towards projects pertaining to infrastructure, health, and education. This focus on the needs of citizens contributed to the growth of mutual trust between Kabul and New Delhi. An examination of Afghan public opinion surveys demonstrates the favorable perception that India enjoyed among the general Afghan population. India’s support and investment in the establishment of essential services such as schools, hospitals, and transportation has made the country proud among the Afghan populace and is consequently viewed favourably across the country.

Construction of Zaranj-Delaram Highway

In particular, India has built the 218-kilometer route effectively, despite sporadic attacks on Border Roads Organization (BRO) employees, which connects the town of Zaranj, close to the Iranian border, to Delaram in northeastern Afghanistan. Additionally, India deserves praise for its noteworthy contribution to the building of highways that have increased Afghanistan’s connectivity to vital ports and decreased Kabul’s reliance on Pakistan.

Constructing Chahbar Port

 India has successfully enhanced Afghanistan’s connection with the Iranian port of Chabahar, therefore mitigating Afghanistan’s dependence on both the ports of “Gwadar and Karachi” in Pakistan. Since Pakistan has always refused to allow land transit for Indian products traveling via its territory to Afghanistan, India’s attempts to construct the Chabahar Port is also driven by the fact that it provides India with the best possible way of entering Afghanistan.³ In July 2013, Indian Ambassador Amar Sinha emphasized India’s commitment to developing Chabahar Port as an alternative transit route for Indian goods to Afghanistan, reducing reliance on Pakistan’s sea-route access.⁴

Indian funding for Construction of Afghan Parliament and Salma Dam

Furthermore, the “Afghan-India Friendship Dam” (formerly called Salma Dam) in Herat was finished by India, and a power transmission line to Kabul was created from it. Also, India finished building Afghanistan’s new parliament.

Furthermore, the Afghan-India Friendship Dam (formerly called Salma Dam) in Herat was finished by India, and a power transmission line to Kabul was created from it. Also, India finished building Afghanistan’s new parliament.⁵

Other Assistances Provided as a part of Assistance Driven Foreign Policy

India also effectively restored the severely damaged “Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health” and sent medical teams to “Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Kandahar” on a regular basis to address Afghanistan’s enormous medical needs.

India awarded 500 scholarships to Afghan students each year through the Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR). India has benefited from its civilian-centric policies. broad acceptance and profound gratitude both among the local population and at the official level. India also, India backed Afghanistan’s admission to SAARC as an official member.⁶

Signing of Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA)

The rationale for deeper and better cooperation between the two nations has been reinforced by a number of high-level official visits from both nations since 2001. To increase trade and commerce, In 2003, India and Afghanistan came up and signed the PTA (preferential trade agreement), with the goal of removing all barriers.⁵ India is now Afghanistan’s fifth-largest import source and one of its main commercial partners thanks to this arrangement.

Signing of “Strategic Partnership” Agreement

Major “Strategic Partnership” agreement between India and Afghanistan was signed on October 4, 2011, and it included provisions for financial and security cooperation, easing the training and equipping of Afghan security forces, economic aid and assistance, advancing mining and energy production, and starting a “strategic dialogue” between their national security advisers to establish a framework for cooperation in the area of national security reclaimed control of the country.⁷

This instance marks a shift in India’s position, considering the provision of offensive armed forces equipment to Afghanistan, marks a notable departure from its previous approach. From the Taliban’s removal in late 2001 to their resurgence in August 2021, India-Afghanistan relations underwent a significant transformation. It is clear from the above events that the type of engagement with Afghanistan post 2001 was proper diplomatic engagement and the relations between the two revolved around the assistance driven foreign policy of India creating soft power in Afghanistan simultaneously.

The Doha Accord and Return of Taliban as De Facto Ruler

When the Taliban seized control of Kabul on August 15, 2021, the US-backed state and nation-building endeavor in the state of Afghanistan came to an end. The country’s capital, and overthrew the civilian government led by Ashraf Ghani. The Taliban’s swift conquest, reminiscent of their 1996 takeover, highlighted the collapse of Afghan security forces in the face of minimal resistance.

With the US army pull out originally scheduled to end on September 11, 2021, but concluded on August 31, 2021, the Taliban felt more confident to begin their campaign of conquest. President Biden’s rationale for withdrawal centered on the belief that the US military presence could not establish a stable democracy in Afghanistan nor defeat the insurgency.

This was a consequent result of the agreement signed by the two, USA-Taliban Signed the Doha Accord, in February 2020, which in turn marked a significant event in the effort to end the war in Afghanistan. Herein what is problematic and quintessential is to note that India or even for that matter Ghani led Afghani Government was not a part of this accord. How can such a decision or agreement be made without the involvement of the parties who would be getting affected by such a significant accord. USA- Taliban agreed onto the said points in this Agreement.

• Cease-fire– In order to achieve a long-term cease-fire between Afghan, Taliban, and American forces, the agreement includes provisions for a brief suspension of hostilities.
• Withdrawal of foreign forces- The agreement stipulated that, within 135 days of its signature, the US would cut its soldier strength in Afghanistan from about 12,000 to 8,600. All foreign forces, including American forces, would leave the country after fourteen months if the Taliban kept their commitments.
• Talks with the Afghan government– it was committed by the Taliban to start talks with the Afghan government in March 2020. This marked a significant step, as the Taliban had previously resisted direct negotiations with the government, which it viewed as a puppet of the United States.
• Counterterrorism assurances– The Taliban guaranteed that Afghanistan would not be used as a base for terrorist activities against the United States and any of its allies. This commitment aimed to address concerns about the resurgence of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Afghanistan following a U.S. withdrawal.⁸

How to Engage with Taliban: Way Forward

Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan has posed significant challenges for India, particularly given its historical approach to the region, which has been perceived as a zero-sum game against Pakistan. The return of the Taliban suggested a strategic defeat for India, as Pakistan stood to gain from the overthrow of the Kabul government. India concentrated on removing its diplomatic staff and nationals from Afghanistan, wherein the Pakistan’s leadership expressed euphoria, viewing the Taliban’s triumph as breaking the “shackles of slavery” for Afghans.⁵

In the wake of the Taliban’s swift takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, reminiscent of their 1996 conquest, India faced a strategic dilemma it had encountered before. Historically, India had aligned itself with non-Pashtun factions, such as the Northern Alliance, against the Taliban, leading to strained relations during the Taliban regime. However, post-2001, India pivoted towards supporting the Afghan state, becoming a significant aid donor and fostering diplomatic ties with successive governments. Despite warnings from analysts about the Taliban’s resurgence, India focused solely on engaging with the Kabul government, neglecting direct dialogue with the Taliban. This reluctance stemmed from historical animosity, security concerns, and a commitment to human rights, including women’s rights.

As the Afghan state collapsed amid the Taliban’s takeover, India found itself losing ground once again, compelled to close its diplomatic missions in Afghanistan. With the Taliban firmly in control, India faced a stark reality: it had no choice but to engage with the Taliban to maintain any semblance of strategic presence in the region

India’s dismay over the unfolding developments in Afghanistan was compounded by its exclusion from the Doha Accord, signed between the United States and the Taliban, which laid the groundwork for peace negotiations. India’s absence from the accord underscored its limited influence in shaping the post-conflict landscape in Afghanistan. Despite ongoing peace talks pursued by the West, August 2021 was seen as a strategic setback due in part to India’s failure in engaging with the Taliban.⁹

But all of this is just looking backward. The more pressing question at hand is how India should reconsider its strategy in Afghanistan to preserve a strategic presence there even in the face of Taliban rule. There is just one simple solution: New Delhi must communicate with the Taliban. To this end, New Delhi has taken a few noteworthy actions. Just as the United States was about to complete its troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the UN Security Council, chaired by India, passed a resolution classifying the Taliban as a state actor.¹⁰ If the resolution had not passed, New Delhi would not have had as much chance to win over the Taliban.

Afghanistan had previously benefited substantially from Western financial aid; but, the sudden withdrawal of foreign soldiers and the following closure of Western embassies in Kabul signaled a tough moment for the country. Food shortages emerged as one of the main difficulties the Taliban leadership was dealing with after a poor crop season and a lack of western help caused the Afghan economy to collapse. India promptly announced food aid for Afghanistan, adhering to its long-standing policy of giving priority to civilians. Afghanistan would get 50,000 MT of wheat, as declared by India. In fact, to arrange for the delivery of wheat to Afghanistan, India and the World Food Programme (WFP) signed a Memorandum of Understanding.

Three consignments totaling around 6500 MT of wheat have already been shipped from India. India’s assistance was hailed by the Rome-based World Food Programme (WFP) as “landmark” and New Delhi was thanked for its “generous contribution of wheat in support of the people of Afghanistan facing severe food shortages.”¹¹ Not only was India’s food aid humanitarian in nature, but it also served as a pretext or a beginning point for the Indian state to start direct talks with the Talibani government.

The Taliban among others in Afghanistan expressed great gratitude for India’s wheat deliveries. In exchange, the Taliban agreed to create a safe space for the Indian embassy in Kabul as a gesture of goodwill and reciprocity.

New Delhi has decided to continue the long-standing practice of giving Afghanistan financial support, even though India has not yet completely reopened its embassies and consulates there. The Indian government announced on February 1, 2022, that Afghanistan will receive Rs. 200 crores, or approximately US$ 27 million, in the fiscal budget for 2022–2023. The funds would support ongoing Indian projects in the country as well as assistance and scholarships for students and inhabitants of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s ambassador to India, Farid Mamundzay, commended India’s financial assistance offer. Mundzay praised India for keeping up its financial support for Afghanistan in the face of Taliban authority, saying that it “is a signal that India is not switching off”.¹²

India still gives Afghanistan food, medication, and financial support. While this might aid India in maintaining the goodwill it has built up over the previous 20 years in Afghanistan; India must go above and beyond these assistance-driven initiatives in order to strive to carve out a strategic position for itself in Afghanistan. The worsening ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan would be a good place to start. Pakistan launched airstrikes on the eastern Afghan regions of Kunar and Khost on April 16, 2022, killing at least 47 people, including women and children.. In response, Pakistan received a warning from the Taliban not to conduct such assaults inside of Afghanistan. In response to the bombings, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid declared, “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan condemns in the strongest possible terms the bombardment and attack that has taken place from the Pakistan side on the soil of Afghanistan.”¹³ The path towards animosity between Afghanistan and Pakistan is being paved by this savagery. We are demanding the respect of our sovereignty and are employing every possibility to stop the recurrence of such actions.¹⁴ According to Pakistan, the strikes were lawful since they were intended to target militants affiliated with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). There have been recent tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, which many think stem from the TTP’s close ideological and organizational support of the Taliban.¹⁵

 Senior Taliban commanders met with an official delegation from New Delhi during the first week of June 2022. The group was led by “J.P. Singh, Joint Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran division.” The delegation’s main topics of discussion were trade and India’s willingness to offer humanitarian help. The delegation also visited development initiatives financed by India. The Taliban again proposed that India should open diplomatic ties with Afghanistan and carry on with consular operations. Pakistan reaffirmed following the meeting that Islamabad still sees India as a “spoiler” in Afghanistan.¹⁶

Kabul’s relations with Islamabad have deteriorated, regardless of Pakistan’s accusations. India can take a more proactive role and establish the groundwork for a newfound strategic footing under the Taliban administration, given that Afghanistan still has a difficult time handling the crises of food, medicine, and healthcare facilities. There will never be any real gains for India from staying away from the Taliban and Afghanistan. India’s ability to take advantage of the Taliban’s discontent with Pakistan and tip the scales in its favour depends on developing a cooperative relationship with them.⁵

Conclusion

Afghanistan holds paramount importance for India due to its strategic, political, economic, and cultural significance. Between 2001 and 2021, Indian foreign policy towards Afghanistan was primarily characterized by an assistance-driven approach, marked by direct engagement with the Afghan government led by figures like Ashraf Ghani. This period saw significant investments in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and other developmental projects, along with the establishment of diplomatic missions to foster bilateral ties. 

However, with the resurgence of the Taliban and their assumption of power in Afghanistan, India faces a new strategic reality. Moving forward, India’s approach must adapt to the changing circumstances, focusing on continued assistance to the Afghan people while engaging with the broader Afghan society directly. This entails indirect engagement with the Taliban regime while prioritizing interactions with the Afghan public to safeguard India’s interests and influence in the region. By maintaining a multifaceted approach that balances assistance with strategic diplomacy.

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